In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.
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Frege’s work on the logical foundation of real analysis remained fragmentary; the second volume of Grundgesetze contains only preliminary definitions and theorems. Previous logic had dealt with the logical constants andorif From to he taught mathematics at the University of Jena as a lecturer; in he was promoted to adjunct professor, and in to associate professor. Bauer-Mengelberg Harvard University Press,pp. Essays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics.
Blackwell GeachP. Notes to Jourdain, Philip E.
A logic-mathematical enquiry into the concept of numberOxford: Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Thesis 2 is a consequence of Frege’s view that the ontological category of an entity may be read off reliably from the linguistic category of expression that denotes the entity: In childhood, Frege encountered philosophies that would guide his future scientific career.
But the issue is difficult to judge, not only because the language of the earlier work is rather imprecise but also because it is not clear whether Frege was aware of the significance of the distinction between objectual and substitutional quantification. One of Frege’s stated purposes was to isolate genuinely logical principles of inference, so that in the proper representation of mathematical proof, one would at no point appeal to “intuition”.
White of Frege’s work in the German collection Hermes et al. While conventional accounts of meaning took expressions to have just one feature referenceFrege introduced the view that expressions have two different aspects of significance: Koebner, ; reprints Breslau: The diagrammatic notation that Frege used had no antecedents and has had no imitators since.
Causal theory of reference Contrast theory of meaning Contrastivism Conventionalism Cratylism Deconstruction Descriptivist theory of names Direct reference theory Dramatism Expressivism Linguistic determinism Logical atomism Logical positivism Mediated reference theory Nominalism Non-cognitivism Phallogocentrism Quietism Relevance theory Semantic externalism Semantic holism Structuralism Supposition theory Symbiosism Theological noncognitivism Theory of descriptions Verification theory.
Reicher – – Grazer Philosophische Studien Second Series,” in CPpp. Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy. Importantly, it was soon observed that Frege arithmetic i. The first of these is an admonition to separate the logical from the psychological a motif that runs through all of Frege’s works ; the third demands observance of the concept-object distinction.
Review of Georg Cantor: Beaney, Michael, and Erich H. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Gabriel suggests the date of The Reason’s Proper Study: First, the principle is not ontologically innocent, since it requires the first-order domain to be infinite, which is usually taken to be incompatible with analyticity.
Geach in Geach Geach and Black  pp. This article has no associated abstract.
Concept and object
The sense of an expression is said to be the “mode of presentation” of the item referred to, and there can be multiple modes of representation for the same referent. While the second volume of Grundgesetze was in press, he hastily devised a quick fix that has come to be known as Frege’s way out and added an appendix to the book, expressing both confidence that the revised system would prove capable of reconstructing arithmetic and worries about the philosophical underpinning of his revised basic law V.
The situation changed somewhat in the wake of John Langshaw Austin ‘s English translation of the Grundlagenwhich appeared in ; Frege was read, at that time, mainly as a philosopher of language, and as such influenced, among others, the British begritf Peter Geach.
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Gottlob Frege, Über Begriff und Gegenstand – PhilPapers
Thomae, Sammlung von Formeln welche bei Anwendung der elliptischen und Rosenhain’schen Funktionen gebraucht werden. Bertrand Russell, just when the printing of this volume was nearing its completion. Oxford University Press, first edition MartinichA. This Gegwnstand was compiled and cross-checked with the help of Bynum Beaney Hermes and Angelelli .