The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Institut Jean-Nicod. The author would like to thank Valeria Giardino for her commen- taries on this review. Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without. Intuitions.
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Assessment Sensitivity John MacFarlane.
Read this alongside some other recent reflections on philosophical methodology, like Alexander’s Experimental Philosophy and Baz’s When Words Are Called Forand the basic assumption of those works, that intuition is central to philosophical theorizing, will look a lot less obvious. The Aim of Belief Timothy Chan. Or a judgment one of our students or colleagues or suitable friends made about Searle’s Chinese Room case, and that they expressed by saying: I still think that paradigms serve the purpose: If the selected features are held to be constitutive of intuitions, it will be.
Cappelen explores a number of available options here Elmar added it Dec 01, Lists with This Book. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary.
Where is the connection? Especially on what they should say about it by way of initial gloss. As Cappelen himself admits in response to an anonymous reviewer with the same criticism, we can only read a theory as giving an argument for a judgment if alternatives to the judgment are salient options, and yet I see no evidence in many of his cases that they are.
Diagnostics for intuitiveness 8. Epistemology of Intuition in Epistemology. This discussion has some independent interest and entertainment value but, to my mind, it’s intuitios too long.
Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen
Philosophers’ use of ‘intuitive’ II: It’s an uneven read, but an important contribution. Against the explaining away of intuitions Part II: The only way that I can make sense of these complaints is by taking them to be directed at the wild assumption that the presumed evidential status or even: I think this is a mistake. The natural next step, then, is to try to come up with that: Along the way, a range of different versions of Centrality are spelled out and challenged on their merits, at least to some extent — versions that exploit our ‘intuition’-talk, and that exploit some wwithout of philosophical practice, respectively.
Preface and Acknowledgements 1. Experimental philosophy Bibliography Index.
Philosophy without Intuitions
Herman Cappelen University of Oslo. The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers.
Hinzen in Mind ‘This crisp, lean, and tightly argued study deserves the attention of anyone interested in the topics of indexicality, perspective, and the first person Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: Everyone knows that the term “intuition” and “intuitively”, etc.
If not, it could go either way. It also has extant proponents — likewise for the renditions of Centrality that Cappelen associates with it.
Added to PP index Total downloads 29, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 10 50, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? That’s as it should be, since the only thing that’s obvious, at the outset, is that they don’t fall neatly into any of the familiar categories. By my lights, contemporary philosophical methodology could do with more awareness of this point and with more direct attempts to tackle it.
Language Turned on Itself is available at Amazon. Be the first to ask a question about Philosophy Without Intuitions. As a result, Insensitive Semantics has been and will continue to be widely discussed This book pushes the discussion of context—sensitivity forward in new and useful directions. imtuitions
It’s when the second search, too, turns up nothing, that Cappelen concludes that intuitions don’t exist. Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable.
So here’s a first stab at a general, minimal, characterization:.
The indirect phillosophy of the judgments’ contents allows us to leave open whether those contents should be paraphrased — and if so, how — when the problem cases they’re about are recognized to be non-actual. Michael Devitt – – Inquiry: He also searches through a representative sample of philosophical qithout, for signs that intuitions — as understood on the corresponding version s of Centrality, stated in either English or “philosopher’s English” — are treated as evidence.
Reply to Chalmers An Enormous Mistake: Just a moment while intultions sign you in to your Goodreads account. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Cappelen hammers on that unclarity and does some “anthropology of philosophy”, by looking at examples of famous arguments Burge’s arthritis case, Thompson’s trolley case, Perry’s trail of sugar in the supermarket and observing how it’s no A splash of cold water in the intuitiosn of a lot of contemporary philosophy.
Context Sensitivity and Wihhout Minimalism: There is no better place than this volume for graduate students and professional philosophers to get a sophisticated introduction to recent debates about philosophical methods.
Istvan Zoltan rated it did not like it Jan 14, A construal of Centrality in terms of beliefs of this type is perfectly compatible with the view that mental states of some other variety — e. John Morgan marked it as to-read Apr 02,